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We identify a new route through which patent protection may af-
fect R&D incentives, the tournament eﬀect. It may decrease R&D
incentives, in which case patent protection may either adversely aﬀect
the level of R&D, or may discourage licensing. In either case welfare
may fall.
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The main justiﬁcation for the institution of patents is that it enhances R&D
incentives by providing protection against imitation (by giving the inventor
temporary monopoly rights to her invention), thus allowing the recovery of
R&D costs. While the above argument has great explanatory power,1 we
argue that it does not exhaust the implications of the patent system.
We identify a new route through which patent protection may aﬀect
the R&D incentives, the tournament eﬀect (henceforth T.E.). Suppose that
several ﬁrms have claim to the same invention. In the presence of patent
protection, at most one of these ﬁrms can obtain the technology, whereas in
the absence of patent protection, all such ﬁrms can obtain the technology.
Thus patents eﬀectively turn R&D competition into tournaments.
2 The Basic Model Without Licensing
The market comprises two ﬁrms, 1 and 2 producing a single homogeneous
commodity. Let qi denote the output of ﬁrm i. The inverse market demand
function f(q), where q = q1 + q2, satisﬁes
Assumption 1. f(q) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, negatively
sloped and satisﬁes the decreasing marginal revenue property i.e. f0(q) +
qif00(q) < 0, ∀q,qi.
Initially, the cost functions of both the ﬁrms are given by cq. However,
both the ﬁrms, by investing an amount F (> 0) in R&D, can change its cost
function to c0q, where 0 ≤ c0 < c.2
The ﬁrms play a two stage game where, in stage 1, they simultaneously
1See Scherer (1980), chapter 16, for a thorough discussion of the patent system. For
an incisive critique, see Boldrin and Levine (2003).
2We assume that the R&D technology is deterministic and involves process innovation.
However, these assumptions can be relaxed without aﬀecting the results qualitatively.
1decide on whether to invest in R&D or not, while in stage 2, they simul-
taneously decide on their output level. Once the R&D decisions have been
made, the subsequent outcome in stage 2 depends on whether there is patent
protection or not.
First consider the case where there is no patent protection. There is
spill-over of technology (caused, for example, by the movement of personnel
across ﬁrms, etc). Thus if only ﬁrm i does R&D, it’s cost function shifts
down to c0q. However, because of spill-overs, the cost function of ﬁrm j also
shifts down to ˜ cq, where c0 ≤ ˜ c ≤ c. If ˜ c = c0, we say that there is complete
spill-over. Whereas if there is no spill-over then ˜ c = c.
Next consider the case where there is patent protection.
In case only ﬁrm i does R&D, ﬁrm i obtains the patent. Hence the cost
function of ﬁrm i shifts to c0q, whereas, because of the patent, that of ﬁrm
j remains at cq.
Whereas if both the ﬁrms invest in R&D then the ownership of the patent
is disputed. We shall focus on two possible scenarios.
In case the litigation costs of contesting a patent is very small, both the
ﬁrms will contest the patent. For simplicity we assume that both the ﬁrms
have an equal probability of being awarded the patent by the courts.
Whereas if litigation costs are relatively large,3 then the outcome will
involve one of the ﬁrms claiming the patent for the new invention, while the
other ﬁrm will not contest it for fear of incurring litigation costs. Assuming
that there is an equal probability of either ﬁrm relinquishing its claim, again
the ﬁrms have an equal probability of obtaining the patent.
Given the preceding discussion, we work with a reduced form game which
incorporates the features that if both the ﬁrms invest in R&D, then they
both obtain the patent with probability half and there are no litigation costs.
3To quote Scherer (1980), “Between 1900 and 1941, 684 radio patents were entangled
in a total of 1957 infringement suits..... A single lawsuit over petroleum cracking patents
lasted 15 years, piling up court costs and legal fees exceeding 3 million.”
2Note that the above formulation implicitly assumes that licensing is
not possible.4 Of course, for licensing to take place it is necessary that
it should lead to an increase in aggregate industry proﬁts. However, even
then technology transfer may involve costs that may make licensing infea-
sible. Suppose, for example, that the new technology is embodied in the
R&D personnel, at least to some extent. Then licensing would require such
research personnel to devote a substantial amount of time to the transfer
process, with large opportunity costs for the transferring ﬁrm (see Boldrin
and Levine (2003)). In fact, such costs are likely to be large in case of
new technologies which are unlikely to be completely codiﬁed and stan-
dardized. Alternatively, licensing may make it easier for competing ﬁrms
to invent around the patent, perhaps even develop superior products (see
Tirole (1988)).
We solve for the set of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria of
the above game.
Stage 2. Given the assumptions on the demand and the cost functions,
it is standard to show that for every possible cost conﬁguration the second
stage game has a unique Cournot equilibrium. Moreover, the equilibrium is
locally stable. Given that the equilibrium is unique, it must be symmetric if
the ﬁrms have the same cost function.5 Hence we can introduce the following
notations for the equilibrium payoﬀs in stage 2 (gross of R&D costs):
π(x,x) denotes the gross equilibrium payoﬀ of both the ﬁrms when both
the ﬁrms have the cost function xq, where x ∈ {c,c0}.
πi(x,y) denotes the gross equilibrium payoﬀ of the i-th ﬁrm when the
cost function of ﬁrm 1 is xq and that of ﬁrm 2 is yq, x 6= y, x,y ∈ {c,c0,˜ c}.
Given that the Cournot equilibrium is unique, π1(c0,˜ c) = π2(˜ c,c0) and
4Firestone (1971) argues that most of the patents held by corporations are used exclu-
sively by these corporations.
5See Vives (1999), Chapter 4.
3π1(˜ c,c0) = π2(c0,˜ c). The following ranking is natural:
π1(c0,c) = π2(c,c0) > π(c0,c0) > π(c,c) > π1(c,c0) = π2(c0,c),
and, for ˜ c < c, π1(c0,c) > π1(c0,˜ c), π1(˜ c,c0) > π1(c,c0). (1)
Straightforward calculations demonstrate that the above ranking is respected
for linear demand functions.
Deﬁnition. Let both the ﬁrms invest in R&D. The tournament eﬀect
denotes the diﬀerence between the equilibrium payoﬀ of the two ﬁrms in the




Clearly, T.E. is positive whenever
π1(c0,c) + π1(c,c0) > 2π(c0,c0). (3)
3 The Analysis
First consider the stage 1 payoﬀ matrix without patent protection:
R&D No R&D
R&D π(c0,c0) − F, π(c0,c0) − F π1(c0,˜ c) − F, π2(c0,˜ c)
No R&D π1(˜ c,c0), π2(˜ c,c0) − F π(c,c), π(c,c)
where the strategies of ﬁrm 1 are written vertically and those of ﬁrm 2
are written horizontally. For every payoﬀ vector the ﬁrst and second entry
represent, respectively, the net equilibrium payoﬀ of ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2.






2 − F π1(c0, c) − F, π2(c0,c)
No R&D π1(c,c0), π2(c,c0) − F π(c,c), π(c,c)
4We then compare the incentive for R&D with and without patent pro-
tection. These can be of two kinds, strategic and non-strategic.
Deﬁnition. The non-strategic incentive for R&D is ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ from
R&D, net of its payoﬀ from not doing R&D, when ﬁrm j does not do R&D.
Let the non-strategic incentive for doing R&D in the absence of patent pro-
tection be denoted by N(NP) and that in the presence of patent protection
be N(P). Clearly,
N(NP) = π1(c0,˜ c) − π(c,c) − F, (4)
and N(P) = π1(c0,c) − π(c,c) − F. (5)
Deﬁnition. The strategic incentive for R&D is ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ from
R&D, net of its payoﬀ from not doing R&D, when ﬁrm j invests in R&D.
Let the strategic incentive for doing R&D in the absence of patent protection
be S(NP) and that in the presence of patent protection be S(P). Clearly,




− π1(c,c0) − F. (7)
Given that π1(c0,c) ≥ π1(c0,˜ c) it is easy to see that N(P) ≥ N(NP),
i.e. in a non-strategic context patent protection increases the incentive for
R&D. This is the textbook justiﬁcation for patent protection.
Next consider the eﬀect of patent protection on the strategic incentive





The ﬁrst term in square brackets represents T.E., whereas the second term
in square brackets captures the eﬀect of patents in ensuring that ﬁrms do
not gain from spill-overs. This term is necessarily positive.
From equation (8), note that S(P) > S(NP) if and only if
π1(˜ c,c0) >
2π(c0,c0) − π1(c0,c) + π1(c,c0)
2
. (9)
5Observe that equation (9) is always satisﬁed if there is complete spill-over,
i.e. if ˜ c = c0. Moreover, the L.H.S. of equation (9) is decreasing in ˜ c.
Our ﬁrst proposition follows from the above observations.
Proposition 1. (i) If T.E. is positive, i.e. if π1(c0,c) + π1(c,c0) >
2π(c0,c0), then, for all ˜ c ∈ [c0,c], patent protection increases the strategic
incentive for R&D.
(ii) If T.E. is negative, i.e. if π1(c0,c) + π1(c,c0) < 2π(c0,c0), then there
exists ˆ c such that patent protection increases the strategic incentive for R&D
for all ˜ c < ˆ c and decreases it for all ˜ c > ˆ c.
Proof. (i) Follows from equation (8) and the fact that T.E. is positive.
(ii) Note that eqn. (9) is satisﬁed for ˜ c = c0 and violated for ˜ c = c. Given
that the L.H.S. of eqn. (9) is decreasing in ˜ c, the result follows.
We then examine conditions under which T.E. is positive.6 Suppose that
c0q is drastic compared to cq, i.e. π1(c,c0) = π2(c0,c) = 0 and π1(c0,c) =
π2(c,c0) = πm(c0), where πm(c0) denotes the monopoly proﬁt of a ﬁrm
having the cost function c0q. Thus in this case equation (3) simpliﬁes to
πm(c0) > 2π(c0,c0). Since the rent dissipation eﬀect associated with Cournot
competition is avoided under a monopoly, this is always true. Thus in this
case T.E. is positive. However, T.E. may be be positive even if c0q is non-
drastic with respect to cq, e.g. consider the case where the demand function
is q = 14 − p, c = 10 and c0 = 7.
We then consider c0 close to c. Since, from symmetry, π1(c,c0) = π2(c0,c),
equation (3) can be re-written as
π1(c0,c) + π2(c0,c) > 2π(c0,c0), (10)
where the L.H.S. of equation (10) represents the aggregate market proﬁt
when ﬁrm 1’s cost function is c0q and ﬁrm 2’s is cq. We can then appeal
6Under price competition T.E. is necessarily positive.
6to Tirole (1988), Chapter 10, Exercise 10.10, to claim that for c0 close to c,
equation (10) is necessarily violated.
Given the above discussion the next proposition follows from continuity.
Proposition 2. (i) If, for c = 0, cq is drastic compared to cq, then there
exists 0 ≤ c00 < c such that T.E. is positive for all c0 ∈ [0,c00).
(ii) There exists 0 < c000 < c such that T.E. is negative for all c0 ∈ (c000,c).
Finally, we solve for the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria
of the whole game under both the regimes.
Proposition 3. (A) Suppose that T.E. is positive.
(i) If S(NP) ≥ 0, then, irrespective of whether there is patent protection
or not, both the ﬁrms investing in R&D constitutes an equilibrium.
(ii) If S(NP) < 0 ≤ S(P), then, both the ﬁrms investing in R&D con-
stitutes an equilibrium under patent protection, but not in its absence.
(B) Suppose that T.E. is negative. If S(NP) ≥ 0 > S(P), then both the
ﬁrms investing in R&D constitutes an equilibrium in the absence of patent
protection, but not in its presence.
Proof. Proposition 3(A)(i) follows since if T.E. is positive then S(P) >
S(NP) ≥ 0.
The proofs for the other parts of the proposition are straightforward.
Proposition 3 demonstrates that if T.E. is positive, then patent protec-
tion has a positive eﬀect on the equilibrium level of R&D. Whereas if it is
negative, and S(NP) ≥ 0 > S(P), then patent protection may have a nega-
tive eﬀect on equilibrium R&D. If, in addition, π1(c0,c)−F > π(c,c), then,
under patent protection, there are two equilibria both of which involve only
one of the ﬁrms investing in R&D.7 Whereas if π1(c0,c) − F < π(c,c) then,
7Furthermore, there is a symmetric equilibrium in completely mixed strategies.
7under patent protection, there is a unique equilibrium where neither of the
ﬁrms invest in R&D.
Clearly the welfare eﬀect in case patent protection adversely aﬀects the
equilibrium level of R&D, is ambiguous. While patent protection may re-
duce the level of R&D, and hence the level of competition in the market,
it does reduce wasteful duplication of R&D. Depending on the parameter
conﬁguration (in particular the value of F), either eﬀect may dominate.
4 Licensing
We next extend the analysis to allow for licensing. For simplicity we assume
that technology transfer is costless. We consider a three stage game, where,
in stage 1 the ﬁrms decide on whether to invest in R&D or not, in stage 2
there is licensing (possibly), and in stage 3 there is quantity competition.
Consider the stage 2 licensing game. At this stage the R&D cost F is
sunk. Thus, in the absence of patents, such licensing would take place if and
only if 2π(c0,c0) ≥ π1(c0,˜ c) + π1(˜ c,c0). Similarly, in the presence of patents,
such licensing would take place if and only if 2π(c0,c0) ≥ π1(c0,c)+π1(c,c0).
We assume that in case of licensing, the outcome follows the asymmetric
Nash bargaining solution, where the weight of the transferring ﬁrm is α,
0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
The case of interest is where there is licensing in the absence of patent
protection, but not in the presence of patent protection (i.e. T.E. is nega-
tive). In that case we ﬁnd that patents may discourage licensing, leading to
a possible decrease in welfare.
Proposition 4. Let π1(c0,c)+π1(c,c0) > 2π(c0,c0) ≥ π1(c0,˜ c)+π1(˜ c,c0).
Moreover, let π1(c0,c) − π(c,c) > F >
π1(c0,c)−π1(c,c0)
2 and 2απ(c0,c0) −
απ1(˜ c,c0) + (1 − α)π1(c0,˜ c) − π(c,c) > F > (2α − 1)π(c0,c0) − απ1(˜ c,c0) +
(1 − α)π1(c0,˜ c). Then patent protection leads to a reduction in eﬃciency,
8and possibly in welfare.
The proof, which is straightforward, has been omitted. In the absence
of patent protection, the equilibrium involves exactly one of the ﬁrms doing
R&D. However, there is licensing, and both the ﬁrms obtain the technology.
In the presence of patenting, the equilibrium again involves exactly one of
the ﬁrms doing R&D. However, there is no licensing, so that only one of
the ﬁrms has the new technology.8 Given the decreasing marginal revenue
property of f(q), this causes a reduction in aggregate output and consumers’
surplus, and hence possibly in welfare.
5 Conclusion
Depending on the eﬃciency of the new technology vis-a-vis the old one, T.E.
may either increase or decrease R&D incentives. In case it decreases R&D
incentives, patent protection may adversely aﬀect the level of R&D, as well
as welfare. Moreover, if T.E. is negative, then patenting may discourage
licensing, thus leading to a reduction in eﬃciency, and possibly in welfare.
Acknowledgements: I am grateful to an anonymous referee for very
helpful comments and suggestions, in particular for encouraging me to ex-
amine the case with licensing.
8Note that this eﬀect cannot arise in models with a competitive fringe (often employed
in the literature), where licensing always takes place.
96 Appendix
Note 1. Formally modelling the ﬁrms’ decision regarding whether
to claim a patent or not when both the ﬁrms decide to do R&D:
Let the litigation costs, in case both the ﬁrms decide to claim a patent,
be L. In case only one of the ﬁrms claim the patent, then there are no such
costs. (Of course, even then there would be some administrative costs of
claiming the patent. We, however, assume that these are relatively small.)
Consider the game where both the ﬁrms simultaneously decide whether to
contest the patent or not:





2 − L π1(c0,c), π2(c0,c)
Do not Claim π1(c,c0), π2(c,c0) π(c0,c0), π(c0,c0)
Note that if L <
π1(c0,c)−π1(c,c0)
2 , then the unique equilibrium involves
both the ﬁrms claiming the patent. If, however, L >
π1(c0,c)−π1(c,c0)
2 , then
there are two equilibria. Both these equilibria involve only one of the ﬁrms
claiming the patent, and the other ﬁrm deciding not to claim the patent.
Assume that there is some coordination device which allows the ﬁrms to
coordinate on the above two outcomes with equal probability. Since the
situation is symmetric, it is natural to use a symmetric coordination device.
In that case the expected payoﬀ of both the ﬁrms is
π1(c0,c)+π1(c,c0)
2 . Thus
the expected payoﬀ of both the ﬁrms is
π1(c0,c)+π1(c,c0)




Of course, for intermediate values of the litigation cost, i.e. 0 < L <
π1(c0,c)−π1(c,c0)
2 , the equilibrium would involve both the ﬁrms claiming the
patent and the litigation costs would be non-zero in equilibrium. However,
we refrain from describing this case, since doing so does not in any way add
to the economic content of this paper.
10Note 2. Footnote 5:
Given Assumption 1, uniqueness follows from Kolstad and Mathiesen
(1987), whereas stability follows from Hahn (1962). Finally, given unique-
ness we can show that the outcome is symmetric whenever the costs are
also symmetric. Suppose that both ﬁrms have the same cost function, but
the equilibrium output vector (q∗
1,q∗
2) is such that q∗
1 6= q∗
2. In that case
(q∗
2,q∗
1) also constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the above game, thus violat-
ing uniqueness.
Hahn, F., 1962, The stability of the Cournot oligopoly solution concept,
Review of Economic Studies 29, 329-331.
Kolstad, C. and L. Mathiesen, 1987, Necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for the uniqueness of a Cournot equilibrium, Review of Economic Studies
54, 681-690.
Note 3. Properties of eqn. (9):
(i) Note that in case of complete spill-over equation (9) simpliﬁes to
π1(c0,c) > π1(c,c0), which is always satisﬁed.
(ii) Given Assumption 1, the fact that the L.H.S. of equation (9) is
decreasing in ˜ c, follows from Dixit (1986).
Dixit, A., 1986, Comparative statics for oligopoly, International Eco-
nomic Review 27, 107-122.
Note 4. Demonstrating that eqn. (10) is violated for c0 close
to c:
From Tirole (1988), Chapter 10, Exercise 10.10, observe that eqn. (10) is
violated for c0 close to c, whenever the Cournot equilibrium is locally stable
and the industry marginal revenue is downward sloping. Given Assumption
1, both these conditions are satisﬁed. Note that the industry marginal
revenue is decreasing if and only is 2f0(q) + qf00(q) < 0, i.e. if [f0(q) +
q1f00(q)] + [f0(q) + q2f00(q)] < 0. Given Assumption 1, this is always true.
11Note 5. Example to demonstrate that Proposition 2 is not
vacuous:
Let the demand function be q = a − p.
(i) Note that if a = 11, c = 10 and c0 = 7, then c0q is drastic compared to
cq. This follows since a−2c+c0 < 0. Thus the tournament eﬀect is positive
i.e. Proposition 2(i) goes through.
(ii) Note that if c0q is not drastic, then [π1(c0,c) + π1(c,c0)] > 2π(c0,c0)
if and only if 5c−3c0 > 2a. It is easy to see that this is satisﬁed for a = 14,
c = 10 and c0 = 7, whereas it is violated for a = 20, c = 10 and c0 = 7.
Note 6. Demonstrating that the tournament eﬀect is positive
under price competition (Footnote 6):
Let us abuse notation to use the same notations for the gross equilibrium
proﬁts under both quantity and price competition. Under price competition
with linear cost functions and a homogeneous good we know that π(c0,c0) =
π1(c,c0) = 0, whereas π(c0,c) = min{πm(c0),f−1(c)(c − c0)} > 0. Hence
equation (10) goes through.
Note 7. Example to demonstrate that Proposition 3b is not
vacuous, as well as that depending on the parameter conﬁgura-
tions, patent protection may either increase, or decrease welfare:
Consider the case where the demand function is q = 20 − p, c = ˜ c = 10,
c0 = 7, and F = 11.5. From the additional Note 5(ii) we know that in
this case the tournament eﬀect is negative. Moreover, it is easy to see that
π(c,c) = 11.11, π(c0,c0) = 18.78, π1(c,c0) = π1(˜ c,c0) = 5.44 and π1(c0,c) =
π1(c0,˜ c) = 28.44.
In the absence of patent protection the game matrix is:
12R&D No R&D
R&D 7.28,7.28 16.94, 5.44
No R&D 5.44,16.94 11.11, 11.11
Thus the unique equilibrium involves both the ﬁrms investing in R&D.
In equilibrium the aggregate output is 26/3. Thus the consumers’ surplus
is 37.56, and total welfare is 52.10.
Next consider the game matrix in the presence of patent protection:
R&D No R&D
R&D 5.44,5.44 16.94, 5.44
No R&D 5.44,16.94 11.11, 11.11
Thus there are two possible equilibria. In both these equilibria one of
the ﬁrms invests in R&D, whereas the other ﬁrm does not. In equilibrium
the aggregate output is 23/3. Thus the consumers’ surplus is 29.39, and
total welfare is 51.77.
Hence in the absence of patent protection the unique equilibrium involves
both the ﬁrms investing in R&D, whereas in the presence of patent protec-
tion only one of the ﬁrms invests in R&D. Hence patent protection causes
a reduction in the equilibrium level of R&D. Moreover, both consumers’
surplus and total welfare is reduced as a result of patent protection.
We then modify the above example slightly so that the value of F is
increased to 12. It is easy to check that this will not aﬀect the equilibrium
strategies regarding R&D investment, as well as the quantity levels. Thus,
in the absence of patent protection, the outcome still involves both the ﬁrms
investing in R&D. Thus aggregate welfare is 51.10. Note that the reduction
in welfare is solely because of the increase in F. Next, note that in the
presence of patent protection, the outcome again involves only one of the
ﬁrms doing R&D. Thus the aggregate welfare is 51.27, which is strictly
greater than that in the absence of patent protection.
13Thus if the demand function is q = 20 − p, c = ˜ c = 10, c0 = 7, and
F = 11.5, then patent protection reduces both R&D and welfare. Whereas
if, in the above example, the value of F is increased to 12, then patent
protection reduces R&D, but increases welfare.
Note 8. Mixed Strategy Equilibrium under Patent Protection
when there is no Licensing (Footnote 7):
Let us ﬁrst consider the case where π1(c0,c) − F > π(c,c). In this
case, apart from the pure strategy equilibrium, there is a completely mixed
strategy equilibrium where both the ﬁrms invest in R&D with probability
0 < r < 1, where
r =
2[π1(c0,c) − F − π(c,c)]
π1(c0,c) + π1(c,c0) − 2π(c,c)
.
That 0 < r < 1, follows from the fact that S(P) < 0 and π1(c0,c) − F >
π(c,c).
Whereas if π1(c0,c) − F < π(c,c), then there is no equilibrium in com-
pletely mixed strategies.
Note 9. Sketch of Proof of Proposition 4:
First consider the case where there is no patent protection. Suppose
that ﬁrm i has done R&D, whereas ﬁrm j has not. Given that 2π(c0,c0) ≥
π1(c0,˜ c) + π1(˜ c,c0), there will be licensing. Since ﬁrm i’s bargaining power
is α, ﬁrm i’s post-licensing payoﬀ is
2απ(c0,c0) + (1 − α)π1(c0,˜ c) − απ1(˜ c,c0) − F,
and that of ﬁrm j is
2(1 − α)π(c0,c0) − (1 − α)π1(c0,˜ c) + απ1(˜ c,c0).
Whereas if both the ﬁrms invest in R&D, they both have a payoﬀ of π(c0,c0)−
F. Similarly, in case neither ﬁrm invests in R&D, their payoﬀ is π(c,c).
14Hence, given that 2απ(c0,c0) − απ1(˜ c,c0) + (1 − α)π1(c0,˜ c) − π(c,c) > F >
(2α − 1)π(c0,c0) − απ1(˜ c,c0) + (1 − α)π1(c0,˜ c), there are two equilibria both
of which involve exactly one of the ﬁrms investing in R&D.
Next we consider the case where there is patent protection. Given that
π1(c0,c)+π1(c,c0) > 2π(c0,c0), there is no licensing. Thus the payoﬀ matrix
in stage 1 is the same as that in the absence of licensing (last paragraph,
page 4). Given that π1(c0,c) − π(c,c) > F >
π1(c0,c)−π1(c,c0)
2 , there are
two equilibria both of which involve exactly one of the ﬁrms doing R&D.
Moreover, there is no licensing in equilibrium. Thus in the presence of
patent protection only one of the ﬁrms will have the new technology. Given
the decreasing marginal revenue property of f(q), there is a reduction in
aggregate output and hence in consumers’ surplus. The argument is as








where Q denotes the aggregate output level. From the decreasing marginal
revenue property we have that 2f0(Q) + Qf”(Q) < 0, hence the result.
We then use an example to show that there are parameter values sat-
isfying the hypotheses of Proposition 4. Moreover, for this example patent
protection leads to fall in both eﬃciency and welfare.
Let q = 14 − p, c = 10, c0 = 7, ˜ c = 9, F = 6 and α = 1/2 (symmetric
Nash bargaining). It is easy to check that c0 is not drastic with respect
to either c or c0. Thus π(c,c) = 16/9, π(c0,c0) = 49/9, π1(c,c0) = 1/9,
π1(c0,c) = 100/9, π1(˜ c,c0) = 1 and π1(c0,˜ c) = 9. It is clear that these values
satisfy the hypotheses of Proposition 4.
In the absence of patent protection the game matrix is:
R&D No R&D
R&D 49/9-F, 49/9-F 85/9-F, 13/9
No R&D 13/9, 85/9-F 16/9, 16/9
15Thus there are two equilibria both of which involve exactly one of the
ﬁrms doing R&D, followed by licensing. Note that in this case the aggregate
output is 14/3, leading to a consumers’ surplus of 98/9. Thus the aggregate
welfare is 21.78 − F.
Next consider the game matrix in the presence of patent protection:
R&D No R&D
R&D 101/18-F, 101/18-F 100/9-F, 1/9
No R&D 1/9, 100/9-F 16/9, 16/9
Thus there are two possible equilibria. In both these equilibria one of
the ﬁrms invests in R&D, whereas the other ﬁrm does not. Moreover, there
is no licensing in equilibrium. Next note that the aggregate output is 11/3,
so that consumers’ surplus is 121/18. Thus total welfare is 17.94−F. Note
that this is strictly less than that in the absence of patent protection.
Another example which satisﬁes the hypotheses of Proposition 4, and
where patent protection leads to fall in welfare is one where, q = 11 − p,
c = 10, c0 = 7, ˜ c = 8, α = 1/2 and F = 2. However, it diﬀers from the above
example in that c0 is drastic with respect to c.
Note 10. A few additional results for Section 4:
Let us deﬁne N(NP,L), S(NP,L), N(P,L) and S(P,L) in a manner
analogous to that for N(NP), S(NP), N(P) and S(P) respectively, with
the diﬀerence that we now allow for licensing possibilities.
Result. Suppose π1(c0,c) + π1(c,c0) > 2π(c0,c0) ≥ π1(c0,˜ c) + π1(˜ c,c0).
Then
(i) N(NP,L) ≥ N(NP) and S(NP,L) ≤ S(NP).
(ii) N(P,L) > N(NP,L) and S(P,L) > S(NP,L).
The proofs, which are straightforward, have been omitted. Note that
16the second result shows that in the presence of licensing, patent protection
increases both the strategic, as well as the non-strategic incentive for R&D.
This makes Proposition 4 even more surprising.
Finally, it is straightforward to show that analogous results go through
even if licensing takes place both in the presence, as well as in the absence
of patent protection, i.e. if 2π(c0,c0) ≥ π1(c0,˜ c) + π1(˜ c,c0) and 2π(c0,c0) ≥
π1(c0,c) + π1(c,c0).
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